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We always knew, didn’t we, that he was probably one of our
kind. When the deadly envelopes laced with anthrax spores
claimed their first of five eventual victims - Robert Stevens, a
63-year-old photo editor for the Florida-based tabloid ‘news-
paper’ The Sun - just a few weeks after the 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, most
scientists figured that the killer was connected with the US
biowarfare program, and was almost certainly a scientist.
Using anthrax as a weapon required just too much special-
ized knowledge for the low-tech terror groups we were used
to dealing with; it was simpler to imagine that the powder
came from someone with access to a bioweapons stock and
knowledge of how to handle it. Now, with the recent suicide
of a microbiologist who worked at the US Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick,
Maryland, and the partial release of evidence from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that indicates he was
probably the person responsible, our worst fears have been
realized. Pogo, Walt Kelly’s philosophical cartoon possum,
was right: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”
In the past few days, new details of how this case was finally
solved after almost seven years have come to light, and what
they reveal is the critical role of genomics in identifying the
source of the anthrax. In fact, many of the techniques did
not even exist at the time the anthrax letters were mailed.
As he prepared his poisonous envelopes, the murderer
could not have imagined that their origin would eventually
be revealed by technology beyond his/her ken. As Hamlet
put it: “For murder, though it hath no tongue, will speak
with most miraculous organ.” In this case, the miraculous
organ of genomics.
The best account I’ve read of this fascinating piece of micro-
bial forensics is the front-page story by Nicholas Wade in the
21 August edition of the New York Times [http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/08/21/science/21anthrax.html?partner=
rssnyt&emc=rss]. I’m drawing heavily on this superb article
as I try to summarize what happened.
Paul Keim, a biologist at Northern Arizona University in
Flagstaff, was able to determine from an anthrax sample
taken from Robert Stevens’ corpse that the strain used was
the virulent Ames strain. To identify its source, the FBI hired
a team at The Institute for Genome Research (TIGR), where
the first microbial genomes had been sequenced in the dawn
of the genomics era, to determine the complete DNA
sequence of the lethal strain. This they did, in about four
months (it could be done in days today). When the sequence
was compared with that from a culture of Ames anthrax
maintained at Porton Down in Britain, the UK government’s
research establishment for defense against biological weapons,
several differences were found between the anthrax genome
taken from Stevens and the genome of the Porton Down
strain. The Ames strain originated from a cow that died of
anthrax in Texas in 1981, so the next step was for TIGR to
sequence that ancestral strain, so that a phylogenetic tree of
anthrax substrains could be constructed. Unfortunately, the
bioterror strain turned out to be virtually identical to the
original Ames strain, so it looked as if its source could not be
identified by sequencing.
What finally cracked the case was an inspired bit of old-
fashioned microbiology. An army scientist at Fort Detrick
noticed that cultures of the bioterror strain were not
uniform: one of the colonies had an altered morphology,
suggesting that a small percentage of the cells in the sample
harbored mutations. The odd colony was grown up and
TIGR sequenced its genome; sure enough, there was a small
but significant change. Eventually, a total of eight morpho-
logical variants were identified in the bioterror strain, and all
were sequenced. The lethal strain now had a genetic
fingerprint, the first ever obtained for a microbe: the pattern
of genetic changes in the 1% of spores in the sample that
were different from the other 99%. It turned out much later
that the reason there were so many variations was that the
flask that contained the anthrax strain used in the attacks
held the results of 35 separate preparations of anthrax,
giving the strain ample opportunity to develop mutations. Itwas soon determined that all of the anthrax letters contained
bacteria from the same source.
The FBI was now able to compare this signature pattern of
variations, the bacterial version of the single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) that are used in DNA fingerprinting of
people, to those of anthrax samples obtained from labora-
tories around the world. By 2006 it was clear that the source
of the bioterror strain was a flask in the laboratory of Bruce
Ivins, a  microbiologist at Fort Detrick with a history of
mental instability. But it took two more years before the
investigators succeeded in eliminating other scientists who
might have had access to the flask as possible suspects. As the
FBI began to focus its inquiry on Ivins, he took his own life.
Genomics cannot prove that this man sent the anthrax
letters in 2001, but its success in identifying the source of the
strain marks a landmark in scientific detective work. As
whole organism sequencing becomes even cheaper and
faster, we may see the day when the genetic signature of
microbes found at the scene of the crime, or on the clothing
of a suspect, become as damning evidence as the suspect’s
own DNA. And the new heroes of Crime Scene Investigation
(CSI) could be microbial genome biologists.
Ivins was not a bioweapons scientist. His job at Fort Detrick
was to find an effective vaccine against anthrax strains that
had been turned into a bioweapon. It has been speculated
that his motive in sending the anthrax letters - if he was the
person who did so - may have been to increase demand for
the vaccine he developed. Another possibility is that, as he is
known to have believed that the United States was taking the
possibility of bioterrorism too lightly, he may have carried
out the attacks to raise awareness of the danger and generate
political support for increased focus on biodefense. That
would explain why Senate offices were among the targets.
If that was the tactic, it had unintended consequences:
immediately after the anthrax attacks, White House officials
repeatedly pressured FBI director Robert Mueller to prove
that they were by Al-Qaeda, but the FBI knew very early in
the case that the anthrax used was a version requiring
sophisticated equipment and was unlikely to have been
produced by a low-tech terrorist organization. Nevertheless,
President Bush and Vice President Cheney both speculated
publicly about the possibility of a link between the anthrax
attacks and Al-Qaeda. The Wall Street Journal published an
editorial stating that Al-Qaeda perpetrated the mailings and
that Iraq was the source of the anthrax, thereby displaying
their remarkable ignorance of Middle Eastern affairs: a
secular state like Iraq, ruled by a secular dictator, would be
the last place Al-Qaeda would go for help. A few days later,
Senator John McCain, who will soon be the Republican
contender for the presidency of the United States, displayed
equal ignorance of foreign affairs by suggesting on the David
Letterman Show that the anthrax may have come from Iraq.
Of course, this possibility was one of the many falsehoods
that the Bush administration used as the rationale for their
later invasion of that country.
In another sense, however, the attacks may have had the
intended consequences, because shortly after they occurred,
Congress voted massive increases in spending for biodefense
research, to the tune of more than a billion dollars ear-
marked for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID). Since the recent revelation that the source
of the anthrax was our own army research program and that
one possible motive for the killings was to provoke just such
an increase in support, there has been criticism that the
government overreacted and is investing far too much money
in research aimed at counteracting bioterrorism and far too
little to deal with less sophisticated forms of terror attacks.
I think this criticism is half right: we are paying too little
attention to the possibility of simple methods of achieving
widespread destruction. In our focus on foreign terror
groups and high-tech weaponry, we seem to have forgotten
that, until the events of 11 September the deadliest terror
attack on American soil was perpetrated by a clean-cut
former US soldier, who used a truck full of diesel fuel and
fertilizer to blow up the Oklahoma City Federal Building.
Chemical weapons are cheap and easy to manufacture and
simple to deliver. The same is true of spreading radioactive
material. Low-tech terror offers far more choices of means
and plenty of technical and operational options.
But I don’t think we are spending too much money on
biodefense, even though I believe the possibility of more
attacks like the anthrax letters is remote. I think we need
every dollar we’re spending, but not to protect us from bio-
terrorism. It’s to protect us from infectious diseases.
More than 25% of the world’s deaths are due to infectious
disease, and there is no effective means of prevention or
treatment for many of the most deadly agents, such as Ebola,
Marburg and the other hemorrhagic fever viruses. HIV/
AIDS is controllable with expensive drug cocktails in the
developed world but has so far resisted all attempts at
effective vaccine development. Multidrug-resistant tubercu-
losis is becoming endemic in some parts of the world and is a
potential public-health catastrophe should it spread widely.
The devastating economic consequences of the SARS virus
outbreak point up how vulnerable the world’s economies are
to heath-related disruption. Avian flu seems to have
quietened down but is still out there somewhere, waiting to
learn how to jump the species barrier. Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus and other so-called ‘superbugs’ are
threatening to turn every hospitalization into a game of
Russian roulette. There have been hardly any new classes of
antibiotics developed in the last quarter century, and
resistance to the ones we have is on the rise. Vaccine
development is technically difficult and economically risky;
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major pharmaceutical companies in recent years and is now
in the hands of a few underfunded, and undermanned,
biotechnology companies. We are dangerously close to
returning to the situation of my mother’s childhood, 90
years ago, when virtually every cut or scrape was potentially
life-threatening, and more people perished from infectious
disease during wars than died on the battlefields.
But exactly the same research that is needed to combat low-
probability bioterror attacks is needed to combat high-
probability natural infectious agents. Every project that
NIAID funds to protect soldiers and civilians from manmade
bioweapons could provide a breakthrough in the fight
against AIDS, or tuberculosis, or the flu, or any of the
thousand other natural shocks that flesh is heir to. And as
such research is not going on to the necessary degree in the
private sector, it must be publicly funded if we are to have a
hope of success.
In a world where irony is commonplace, this may be one of
the great ironies of all: that the anthrax attacks of 2001 may
have prodded us into much-needed research on biodefense,
even though bioterrorism is a remote possibility. But that’s
the great thing about effective agents of defense: they don’t
care where the attack is coming from - whether it’s from
nature or, God forbid, from one of us.
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